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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAYNES LAND & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, a partnership, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
JACOB FAMILY CHALK CREEK, LLC, 
a limited liability company; et al , 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20080858-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS (HAYNES PARTIES) 
and APPELLEE BRIEF OF HAYNES PARTIES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL1 
Haynes incorporates the Jurisdictional Statement on Cross-Appeal in the brief of 
Chalk Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Where the roads in question did not appear on maps of the period, there was 
no evidence of a definite path of travel, and no proof that travelers lacked express or implied 
permission, did evidence that some people arrived at that destination compel a finding, under 
JThe trial court record consists of papers from two cases that were ultimately 
consolidated, but the papers in each case were indexed separately for appeal. Papers from 
Haynes Land & Livestock Co. v. Jacob Family Chalk Creek, trial court case no. 980600244, 
will be cited as "R-Haynes." Papers from Triple HRanch, LC v. Boyer, trial court case no. 
000600299, will be cited as "R-TripleH." 
1 
the clear and convincing standard, that a definite road existed to that destination and had been 
used continuously without permission by members of the public for ten years? 
Haynes incorporates the standard of review as stated in the brief of Chalk 
Creek-Hoytsville Water Users Corporation. 
Preservation below: The Haynes parties do not disagree with the statement of Jacobs 
and Boyers that this issue was raised below. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Utah Code §72-5-104(1) (2006): "A highway is dedicated and abandoned to the use 
of the public when it has been continuously used as a public thoroughfare for a period often 
years." 
Utah Code § 72-5-108: "The width of rights-of-way for public highways shall be set 
as the highway authorities of the state, counties, or municipalities may determine for the 
highways under their respective jurisdiction." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Haynes incorporates the statement of the case in its opening brief. 
Boyers assert that they have had uninterrupted access to their land for over 100 years.2 
The trial court found, however, that their access over the East Fork Road was by permission 
and was interrupted by the gates maintained by Haynes.3 The trial court specifically found 
and concluded the Boyers' use was not sufficient to create a prescriptive easement over the 
2Boyers' brief at 3. 
3R-Haynes 1688-89, 1425. 
2 
East Fork Road.4 Boyers have not challenged those findings and are bound by them. Their 
access over the Jacobs property was also by permission.5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The width of a road dedicated to the public by use should be such as will safely 
accommodate the historical use. Taking additional width to accommodate increased use 
would be an unconstitutional taking. Determining that width is a fact-finding endeavor that 
is inherently a judicial function. Although a statute gives a county authority to set road 
standards of what a road should be, it does not grant the county authority to determine what 
width was actually dedicated to the public. Interpreting the statute to allow the county to 
determine width would be unconstitutional. It is particularly improper where the county is 
a named party in the litigation. In this case, the trial court already made a provisional finding 
of width, and that finding should be confirmed by this Court. 
The Haynes's complaint sought to quiet title as against all roads claimed by the 
defendants, and the proof at trial supported this claim. Defendants had the burden of proving 
any easements they might claim across the Haynes property. Haynes is entitled to judgment 
quieting title to its property, excepting only the roads specifically found by the trial court. 
The evidence supports the trial court's determination that there was no clear and 
convincing evidence that the East Fork Road existed as a road and was public beyond the 
point shown on the maps of the period. 
4R-Haynes 1463. 
5See Transcript vol. II, p. 390, 394, 408; R-Haynes 1424, 1446. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
I: DETERMINING THE WIDTH OF A ROAD DEDICATED TO 
THE PUBLIC BY USE IS A JUDICIAL, FACT-FINDING 
FUNCTION THAT CANNOT BE DELEGATED TO A COUNTY 
LEGISLATIVE BODY. 
A. The Decision to Delegate the Determination of Road Width to Summit County Is a 
Legal Conclusion; a Party Is Not Required to Marshal the Evidence in Support of 
Legal Conclusions. 
Jacobs faults Haynes for not marshaling the evidence that supposedly supports the trial 
court's decision to grant Summit County the authority to set the width of the roads. There 
was no obligation to marshal the evidence. "[T]he marshaling requirement applies only to 
challenges of factual findings, not to conclusions of law."6 While marshaling may still be 
required "if a determination of the correctness of a court's application of a legal standard is 
extremely fact-sensitive/'7 that is not the situation here. The trial court concluded that Utah 
Code § 72-5-108 dictated delegation to the county;8 that decision was based on the wording 
of the statute, not on any analysis of the facts. There is no evidence that can be marshaled 
to support such a legal conclusion. 
6Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, \ 17 n. 4, 994 P.2d 193, 198. 
1
 United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, 
f 25, 140 P.3d 1200, 1206. 
8R-Haynes 1471-72, fflj 55-57. 
4 
B. Section 72-5-108 Authorizes a County to Set Road Standards, Not to Take Additional 
Width. 
Haynes's opening brief on appeal argued that Utah Code § 72-5-108 authorized a 
highway authority to set road standards but did not authorize taking, without just 
compensation, whatever additional property was necessary to meet those standards.9 Jacobs 
criticizes the manner in which Haynes presented this argument, claiming that Haynes 
did"[n]ot even attemptf] to find support for this assertion in the statutes themselves."10 
Jacobs are wrong. The prior sentence in the Haynes brief explained that the "discussion 
below" showed that section 72-5-108 did not authorize a county to find the width of a road 
dedicated by user. Haynes cited to a hundred years of case history showing that such 
decisions have always been made by the judiciary11 and noted the absolute lack of any 
decision supporting the trial court's interpretation of the statute.12 Haynes then analyzed the 
wording of the statute itself over the last century, noted that the 1917 version of the statute 
expressly stated that the statute did not authorize changing the existing width of roads,13 and 
explained that where a statute is amended without changing certainportions, the courts must 
presume the legislature approved judicial constructions of the unchanged portions.14 Because 
9Haynes opening brief at 16-17. 
10Jacobs brief at 23. 
nHaynes opening brief at 17-18, n. 80. 
l2Id.p. 18. 
nId. p. 22. 
l4/</.p.21. 
5 
all the cases held width is determined by the court and no case held that section 72-5-108 
allowed the county to set width, this confirmed that the statute did not contain such an 
authorization. Haynes also explained that the recently enacted changes to the road dedication 
statute would have been unnecessary if section 72-5-108 already authorized a county to fix 
the width.15 Finally, Haynes established that interpreting the statute to authorize a county to 
take whatever width it chose would result in a constitutional violation.16 In other words, 
Haynes did show that the statute only authorizes a road authority to set road standards, not 
to take additional land to meet those standards, and was not required to also engage in a 
grammatical parsing of the statute. 
C. Haynes's Arguments Are Not Raised for the First Time on Appeal 
Haynes acknowledges that "in general, appellate courts will not consider an issue, 
including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal."17 Haynes further 
acknowledges that its arguments regarding delegation of core judicial functions were not 
presented to the trial court in the same language as in its appeal brief. But, it does not follow 
that the arguments are newly raised or that they are improper. 
It is clear that Haynes argued to the trial court that fixing width was a judicial function 
that could not be delegated to a county political body. Haynes argued: 
Haynes submit that the Court has the sole and only jurisdiction 
and responsibility to determine width of the right-of-way in this 
l5Id. 
16Id. p. 19. 
11
 State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13, 95 P.3d 276, 280, cited in Jacobs brief at p. 34. 
6 
case; that the width is not a political issue, but is to be 
adjudicated based on the facts and circumstances in evidence in 
this case; that the county has no jurisdiction to adjudicate width 
(even if the facts and circumstances had been tried before "the 
county"), and that the rights and obligations of the parties are 
not to be determined in a vacuum by a "mandate" or an act to 
"legislate" by a county official, department, board or legislative 
body.18 
Haynes further argued: "Section 108 does not put a county legislative body in the role of a 
court."19 Although Haynes did not use the term "core judicial function," the argument is the 
same and is not raised for the first time on appeal. 
Even if the arguments were different, it is not necessary that the arguments be 
identical. In Innerlight, Inc. v. Matrix Group, LLC,20 the Utah Supreme Court considered 
whether the appellant had adequately raised a challenge to the trial court's ruling. The Court 
held the test is whether the main thrust of the argument is the same: 
Although the specific reasoning behind Matrix's conclusion that 
the forum selection and choice of law provisions are enforceable 
differs from this court's reasoning in reaching the same 
conclusion, the fact remains that the main thrust of Matrix's 
argument is that the forum selection and choice of law 
provisions are enforceable. We therefore find that the 
enforceability of the forum selection and choice of law 





The main thrust of Haynes's arguments to the trial court was that determining width 
was a judicial function to be performed by a court, not a policy or legislative decision that 
could be delegated to the county. The arguments on appeal have the same focus and should 
therefore be considered by this Court. 
D. The Delegation to Summit County Was Not Harmless. 
Jacobs makes the curious claim that "Haynes is not harmed" by authorizing Summit 
County to take whatever width of road it chooses from the Haynes's property, reasoning that 
Summit County has the necessary expertise to decide what is best.22 This "I'm from the 
government and I'm here to help you" argument has several flaws. 
First and foremost is the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Regardless 
of the expertise of the Summit County staff members, there is a constitutional difference 
between a policy decision made by county legislative officials and a judicial decision made 
after hearing evidence from all parties. Although the trial court obviously contemplated that 
Summit County would receive input from the parties,23 the court did not require that24 and 
the court set no standards or guidelines for the county to follow in making its decision. 
Furthermore, as shown below,25 the County officials were seeking the width necessary to 
See Jacobs brief at 30. 
23R. Haynes p. 1687 ("Summit County is certainly able to conduct hearings and 
consider input. . . .") 
24Summit County in fact dictated the width without permitting any input from Haynes 
whatsoever. 
25Pages 13-15 of this brief. 
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accommodate possible future development, not the width required to make the road safe for 
its historical uses. Finally, Summit County is not an objective outsider. Rather, the County 
is a named and self-interested party in this litigation. Haynes is clearly prejudiced by the 
delegation to Summit County. 
II: THE WIDTH SHOULD BE SET AT 18 FEET IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING. 
A. Jacobs Had the Burden of Proof on Road Width, and Cannot Complain of the Lack 
of Evidence on that Issue. 
Jacobs assert that road width was not the focus of the underlying litigation and that 
the trial court therefore was not required to make any decision on width.26 Haynes 
acknowledges that the trial court could have chosen to make no decision on width.27 But, it 
must be remembered that Jacobs had the burden of proof on this issue.28 And, Jacobs 
themselves asserted in closing argument that "The second thing that the Court is required to 
Jacobs brief at 21. 
27
 Jacobs accuses Haynes of having taken a contrary position in its motion for summary 
disposition. Jacobs brief at 21. The fact is that the summary disposition motion was focused 
on showing that the trial court could not delegate the width determination to the county, 
because that is what the trial court actually did. There was no reason to explain that the trial 
court could have taken no action. Haynes has always acknowledged that because defendants 
failed to present evidence on width, the trial court was not required to expressly fix the width 
of the road. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum, R-Haynes 1375-76; Memorandum 
Supporting Haynes' Motion for Reconsideration of Road Width, R- Haynes 1510. 
2%See Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 9, 179 P.3d 768, 773 (proponent 
must establish case by clear and convincing evidence); Baxter v. Utah Dep 't ofTransp., 783 
P.2d 1045, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 
411,149 P.2d 827, 827 (1944) (a quiet title defendant has the burden of going forward with 
proof of his challenge to plaintiffs title). 
9 
find is what is the width of the established public road."29 If road width was not a major 
focus at trial it is only because Jacobs failed to present any proof on the issue. The trial court 
correctly noted: "Jacob, to the court's recollection, did not present any evidence directly as 
to the road width at any point along the entire loop."30 
Although Jacobs and Boyers presented no evidence of width, the record is not silent 
on the issue. Haynes gave clear notice that width was of primary concern to it - Haynes 
discussed the width in the Background Facts section of its trial brief31 and devoted two of 
the six argument points in that brief to discuss the width.32 Although Haynes was in a 
defense posture and had no reason to make Jacobs' case for them, Haynes ensured there was 
some evidence in the record on the width and historical condition of the road. William 
Christensen acknowledged on cross-examination that his parents often rented a Jeep to 
traverse the road.33 Fern Boyer testified on cross-examination that her uncle referred to the 
road as "that rocky pile." Budge Christensen testified on cross-examination that the Bench 
Road and Middle Fork Road were primitive two-tire-track roads until the 1970s.34 Howard 
29Transcript vol. V, p. 963 (emphasis added). 
30Memorandum Decision J^ 55 at page 78. 
31R-Haynes 1258. 
32R-Haynes 1271-74. The trial court's statement that width "was not mentioned in 
pre-trial briefs," R-Haynes 1470, is simply incorrect. 
33Transcript vol. II, p. 337. 
34Transcript vol. I, pp. 149-150. 
10 
Haynes Jr., also testified the road was a primitive two-track road.35 Direct evidence of width 
also came from Grant Macfarlane, who testified that most of the road was about eight feet 
wide, with only limited segments that have been recently improved to a greater width.36 
Jacobs argue that because the evidence of width was not extensive, the case should 
be remanded to allow them to present additional evidence.37 A similar request for a second 
chance to present evidence was made, and rejected, in Barker v. Francis™: "That he failed 
to present competent evidence on the issue of damages is his own fault and he has no basis 
for complaint."39 Jacobs similarly have no basis for seeking relief from their own failure to 
present evidence. A long line of Utah cases gave notice that width is an issue in road 
dedication cases.40 Haynes's trial brief gave notice that Haynes viewed width as a primary 
issue. Jacobs therefore have no one to blame but themselves if they failed to present 
evidence on width. Remand to give them a second opportunity would not be appropriate. 
Transcript vol. Ill, p. 620. 
36This evidence was more than sufficient to rebut any statutory presumption, claimed 
by Summit County at page 23 of its brief. Western Kane County Special Service District No. 
1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377 n. 1 (Utah 1987). 
37Jacobsbriefat33. 
38741 P.2d 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
39Id. at 553-54. 
40See cases cited in Haynes's opening brief at pp. 17-18, n. 80. 
11 
B. The Current Width of the Road is Safe. 
Jacobs claim, without any supporting evidence or argument whatsoever, that leaving 
the road in its current condition would "jeopardize the safety of the traveling public."41 Had 
Jacobs marshaled the evidence, it would have shown the road is safe: 
The evidence showed that Jacob had a crane, cement trucks, 
front end loaders, caterpillars, road graders, pipe hauling trucks, 
10 wheel dump trucks, media broadcast trucks, and other large 
vehicles on the Bench and Middle Fork Roads. Those vehicles 
seemed to have made it to what the court has concluded is the 
end of the public road without altering the road in its public 
portions.42 
Notwithstanding the use by heavy equipment, no one testied of accidents or safety 
issues related to the width of the road. Chuck Horman, a witness for Jacobs, testified he 
straightened out a curve on the Haynes property so it would be safer.43 There was no 
evidence that the road in its current condition is unsafe. This Court should therefore reject 
the unsupported claim by Jacobs that the road in its current condition is somehow unsafe. 
C. The Finding of 18 Feet was Provisional but Binding. 
Jacobs accuses Haynes of misleading this Court by arguing that the trial court made 
a provisional finding that the road width should be 18 feet, but not mentioning that the trial 
court also stated that the provisional finding was "in essence dicta." Jacobs further asserts 
that the trial court "firmly rejected" the 18 foot finding. Jacobs is incorrect. 
4Jacobs brief at 26. 
42R-Haynes 1472. 
43Transcript vol. l ,p. 197. 
12 
The trial court's initial post-trial Memorandum Decision stated: 
58. . . . Again, the cases seem to say it is the court's 
responsibility but to this court the statute seems to say otherwise. 
If the court is responsible to declare a width the court believes 
the evidence and law allow the court to declare the road should 
be 18 feet in width... . 
59. . . . The court defers to the county but if the court 
is wrong, rather than return to court, the above conclusions are 
the court's view on the matter.44 
In its Ruling and Order disposing of various post-trial motions, the trial court stated: 
The court believes its memorandum decision was correct. 
. . . The court's comments as to its "feelings" were in essence 
dicta and thoughts as the court ruled and reaffirms that the 
decision as to the width of a public road belongs to Summit 
County.45 
Far from "firmly rejecting" the statements in the Memorandum Decision, therefore, 
the trial court actually reaffirmed them. The court properly labeled its alternative finding as 
"in essence dicta" because that finding had no effect under the court's ruling-it would have 
effect only if the trial court's ruling were reversed. But the Ruling and Order did not 
expressly or impliedly reject the provisional finding that the trial court would fix the width 
at 18 feet if it were the court's prerogative to decide that issue. Nor did the trial court at all 
weaken its statement that the 18-foot provisional finding was intended to apply "if the court 




This Court should, therefore, along with reversing the delegation to Summit County, 
hold that the width of the public roads is 18 feet. 
D. The Road Width Should Accommodate the Use at the Time of Dedication, 
Haynes argued in its opening brief that width must be such as will accommodate the 
historical use.46 Jacobs responded by citing to Jeremy v. Bertagnole.41 That case confirms, 
however, that the relevant inquiry is historical use, not contemplated future development: 
The purpose for which the easement was acquired must 
determine the effect of the right parted with by the owner, and 
the width necessary for the enjoyment of the highway by the 
public... . 
Hence, while it is true as contended by appellant, that 
where dedication is established by user the use to which the way 
has been put measures the extent of the right to use, this 
limitation goes to the kind of use.48 
The proper inquiry, therefore, is what width is necessary to safely accommodate the 
historical types of use. The historical use here was very limited. The defendants, however, 
seek to set the width at what is necessary to accommodate their future development plans. 
Two months after trial, Jacobs submitted an affidavit of Derrick Radke, the Summit County 
Engineer, asserting that the appropriate width to accommodate "approved population 
densities under zoning laws" was 36 feet based on the provisions of the Eastern Summit 
'Haynes's opening brief at pp. 29-32. 
7101 Utah 1,116 P.2d 420 (1941). 
lId. at 9, 116 P.2d at 423-24 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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County Development Code.49 However, Jacobs did not offer the Development Code as 
evidence, and it would have been improper for the trial court to take judicial notice of it.50 
In any event, a review of the portion of the code attached to the affidavit of Derrick 
Radke shows the ordinance does not apply. The ordinance only specifies the width required 
for a road in a new subdivision. The Utah Supreme Court has expressly held that such 
ordinances do not control: 
In granting the plaintiffs motion, the trial court 
apparently relied on the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City 
§ 42-7-5 (1975), as establishing the width of the dugway road at 
fifty feet as a matter of law. This reliance was misplaced. That 
ordinance merely sets forth the minimum standards and 
requirements regarding the widths of streets in a proposed 
subdivision plan. It does not address the reasonable and 
necessary width of a highway dedicated to the public under 
U.C.A., 1953, §27-12-89.51 
Further, the ordinance shows that an 18-foot road is the recommended width for a 30-
mile-per-hour road carrying 25 to 250 people per day.52 The design standard for a low-speed, 
20-mile-per-hour road carrying fewer than 25 people per day is only 14 feet.53 And, there 
was no evidence that the historical scope of use was even that great. Further, the standards 
49R-Haynes 1496. 
50Brigham City v. Valencia, 779 P.2d 1149, 150 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
5lSchaer v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 657 P.2d 1337, 1342 (Utah 1983). 
52Eastern Summit County Development Code § 11-6-9.C.1, attached to affidavit of 
Derrick Radke (R-Haynes 1493-1496). 
53/c/. 
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by their terms apply to "[p]ublic and private roads in subdivisions"5* The roads here are not 
in subdivisions. When these roads were dedicated to the public, it was only for limited use, 
not for subdivision development, so road safety must be measured against that "kind of use." 
If and when Jacobs determine to subdivide their property, they may then need to acquire an 
additional right of way, but possible future development as a subdivision is not justification 
for expanding the scope of the road now without paying just compensation to Haynes. 
E. Taking Additional Width to Support Future Development Would be Unconstitutional; 
Haynes Has Standing to Assert this Claim. 
The trial court determined that the roads became public by use from 1880 to 1896.55 
Haynes argued to the trial court and has reasserted on appeal that the width of the roads must 
be such as will accommodate the use at the time the road became public, and that any other 
rule would result in an unconstitutional taking. In response, Summit County asserts that 
Haynes lacks standing to claim a constitutional taking because any taking occurred long 
before Haynes acquired title.56 In support, Summit County cites to a case holding that the 
owner at the time of a taking is entitled to payment for the taking,57 and another case holding 
55R-Haynes 1459. Jacobs and Boyers have asserted that unrestricted public use 
continued into the 1930s, but the exact date is not critical because there is no evidence of any 
significant change in the character of the road during that time - all the testimony was that 
the road was a narrow, rocky path. See, e.g., Transcript vol. I, pp. 149-50 (the entire road 
was a primitive two-tire track road until the 1970s). See also evidence cited at pages 10-11 
of this brief. 
56Summit County brief at 18-20. 
57Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 284 (1939). 
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that a subsequent owner takes subject to any public easement.58 Those cases are inapposite. 
The issue here is whether the statutes can constitutionally be interpreted to allow the County 
(or the court) to set a width based on any present or contemplated uses beyond those existing 
at the time of the original dedication of the road. 
An analogy highlights the error in Summit County's argument. Suppose that a county 
condemned a 12 foot road in 1910 and paid appropriate just compensation. Could the county 
come back in 2010 and demand that the width be increased, without a separate condemnation 
proceeding and payment of just compensation for the additional width? The obvious answer 
is "no."59 Yet that is no different from what the defendants propose here. 
If the roads became public in 1896, then Haynes took subject to that public road-the 
one that existed at the time Haynes took title. Even without increased width, an increase in 
use or the development of the Jacobs property creates an additional burden on the Haynes 
land.60 If Summit County and the other defendants now seek a wider public road without 
payment of just compensation, Haynes certainly has standing to object to such an 
unconstitutional taking. And, if the argument of Summit County is that a road dedicated to 
the public has a width that is forever subject to modification based on the perceived current 
5
*Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 594, 290 P. 954, 957 (1930). 
59For examples of eminent domain proceedings to widen existing roads, see/vers v. 
Utah DOT, 2007 UT 19,154 P.3d 802; Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36,977 P.2d 
1201; Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. Helm, 547 P.2d 692 (Utah 1976). 
60SeeMcBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996,997 (Utah 1978); Wood v. Ashby, 122 Utah 
580, 587, 253 P.2d 351, 355 (1952). 
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wants of the County, then Haynes has standing to assert that such an interpretation of the 
statutes would result in an unconstitutional taking. 
Summit County also asserts that Haynes needed to follow the claims process of Utah 
Code § 72-5-107. That section, however, and has no application to an effort to widen an 
existing road. If these roads were public, they became so a century ago. The statute does not 
authorize widening the roads years later. 
Ill: HAYNES IS ENTITLED TO QUIET TITLE EXCEPTING ONLY 
EASEMENTS OF RECORD AND THE ROADS FOUND BY THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
The Haynes complaint sought a declaration that "all" the roadways on the Haynes 
property were private. Jacobs had the burden of proving any claims they had that were not 
of record. Jacobs only claimed that the loop road was public, but apparently now wish they 
had also claimed an easement over the road to Red Hole. In response to Haynes's arguments, 
Jacobs employ several techniques to obscure the real issue. Jacobs recharacterize the Haynes 
position as much broader than what Haynes actually asserted, incorrectly claim that the 
recharacterized claim is newly raised,61 and attempt to blame Haynes for Jacobs' own failure 
to understand the scope of the issues in the case. 
Haynes sought a declaratory judgment that "plaintiff is the owner and holder of the 
legal, equitable and record title to all of the Haynes Property free and clear of any and all 
6Paynes could similarly claim that Jacobs' claim on cross-appeal is newly raised. In 
its pre-trial motion for partial summary judgment, Jacobs focused only on Segments A and 
B as shown on Exhibit 117. R-Haynes 555 TJ11. Their cross-appeal, however, focuses on 
Segment C. 
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right, title and interest" of the defendants.62 Haynes further clarified that it sought a 
judgment that "all of the roadways located upon the Haynes Property and the 
Jacob/Christensen property including the portions thereof which the County has heretofore 
erroneously designated as public and/or county roads, are in fact private and have never been 
and are not now public and/or county roads "63 The "portions thereof which the County 
has heretofore erroneously designated as public" referred to the loop road.64 If the claim only 
concerned the loop road, there would have been no point in using the "all. . . including" 
language. 
While the term "all" employed in Haynes' s complaint is expansive, there is no warrant 
for Jacobs' pejorative recharacterization that Haynes seeks a determination that there are 
"absolutely no other encumbrances on its property, past, present, or future."65 The Haynes's 
complaint was limited to asserting there were no roadways on its property, at the time of the 
complaint, beyond those reflected in the recorded documents. 
In addition to the clear language of the complaint, discovery included inquiry about 
the Red Hole area66 and evidence was presented at trial concerning activities in that area.67 
62R-Haynes 8 (emphasis added). See also R-Haynes 4, 5 ffi[16, 20 (R-Haynes 4, 5). 
63Id. (emphasis added). 
6
*See Defendants' Ex. 205. 
65Jacobs brief at 35. 
66E.g., Deposition of Lamont Staley, p. 12. More extensive citation to discovery 
materials is not possible because the discovery is not included in the record. 
61
 E.g., Transcript vol. I, pp. 63, 71, 89, 94-96; Transcript vol. II, p. 289, 425, 428. 
19 
Jacobs presented an exhibit showing metal posts imbedded in concrete and a cable gate at 
the entrance to the Red Hole area, and Stephen Jacob testified that he had pulled out the posts 
himself because they obstructed his access to Red Hole.68 There would have been no purpose 
for this testimony if Red Hole were not an issue in the lawsuit. The fact that Jacobs 
presented this testimony confirms that they viewed Red Hole as an issue. 
Haynes presented their case as plaintiffs at trial by simply presenting the record title 
documents.69 The burden then shifted to Jacobs to establish any exceptions to that record 
title. "[0]nce [a] quiet title plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of ownership, defendant 
has the burden of going forward with proof of his challenge to plaintiffs title."70 Therefore, 
Jacobs had the burden of proof to establish any unrecorded easements that they claimed may 
exist over the Haynes property. Haynes rested its case in the first few minutes of trial.71 The 
trial was really on Jacobs' counterclaim. Rule 13(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
required that Jacobs "shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the 
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim[.]" If Jacobs claimed any 
exceptions to the title alleged and proved by Haynes, Jacobs were obligated to assert those 
68Exhibit 274; Transcript vol. II, pp. 288-289. 
69Transcript vol. l,pp. 9-10, 16. 
^Baxter v. Utah Dep 't ofTransp., 783 P.2d 1045, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), citing 
Gatrell v. Salt Lake County, 106 Utah 409, 411, 149 P.2d 827, 827 (1944). See also 
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520, 524 
(Utah 1990). 
71Transcript vol. I, p. 16. 
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claims in this action. It follows that Haynes is entitled to a decree that there are no 
exceptions beyond those proved by Jacobs. 
IV: THERE WAS NO COMPELLING, CLEAR AND CONVINCING 
EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC ROAD ON THE EAST FORK. 
Boyers assert on cross-appeal that the entire East Fork Road (beyond the middle of 
section 8) should have been declared public. In supposed support, Boyers claim that Howard 
Haynes Jr. acknowledged that a pack trail extended beyond the middle of section 8 when his 
father acquired the property, that LeRoy Meadows and his relatives used the East Fork Road 
to travel to the Blue Lakes during three years prior to 1932, and Fern Boyer testified to 
traveling over the East Fork Road in the 1930s.72 Boyers marshal the fact that the road does 
not appear on several of the maps relied upon by the trial court.73 Boyers fail, however, to 
marshal the following additional evidence relevant to the existence of a public road:74 
1. The gate near highway 133 has always been locked at least 24 hours during 
each year from 1932 to the present, for the express intent of preserving the road as private.75 
72Boyers'brief at 24-26. 
73Boyers'briefat26. 
74The trial court specifically observed that almost all the witnesses were credible. R-
Haynes 1440 Tj 3. 
75Transcript vol. Ill, pp. 676-77 (testimony of Howard Haynes, Jr.); transcript vol. Ill, 
pp. 705-06 (testimony of Shirley Macfarlane). While the trial court specifically found that 
road was blocked after 1941, R-Haynes 1436 ^  73, that does not mean that the court found 
the gates were not locked before then. See R-Haynes 1440 f 3 ("almost all the witnesses are 
found to be credible"). Because the trial court specifically found that use was not interrupted 
from 1880 to 1896 and the roads became public during that time, R-Haynes 1459 at f 42, it 
would have made no difference if the main gate had been blocked in 1932, and the trial court 
had no reason to make a specific finding on that issue. 
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This evidence is alone sufficient to support the trial court's decision. Use only need be 
interrupted once every ten years to prevent a road from becoming public.76 Because the road 
was blocked in 1932, any public use during the ten years before that was interrupted. This 
means that the use by LeRoy Meadows did not create a public road. It also means that the 
use by Fern Boyer form 1932 and 1938 did not create a public road, because it was within 
10 years of the interruption. 
2. Although Fern Boyer testified she traveled on the East Fork road with her 
parents, she also testified the road was mainly horse trails and wagon trails.77 She also did 
not know if they asked permission.78 
3. Wayne Jones (a brother of Fern Boyer), testified that the roads were regarded 
in the community as private roads.79 He testified that he had been turned away by Howard 
Haynes Sr. when trying to go up the East Fork Road.80 When he had traveled up to the 
reservoir, it was with permission.81 
4. Robert Powell testified to going to the reservoir, but testified they did not travel 
on the road to get there.82 
16Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, ^  15, 179 P.3d 768, 774. 
77Transcript vol. II, pp. 431-32. 
nId. p. 448. 
79Transcript vol. IV, p. 795. 
*°Id. p. 796. 
uId. p. 797. 
82Transcript vol. Ill, p. 485. 
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5. While Kay Crittenden testified there was a rough trail beyond the end of the 
road, he also testified that he understood it was private.83 
6. While Howard Haynes Jr. testified there was a trail beyond the end of the road 
up East Fork, he testified it was used for people looking for sheep and things like that.84 The 
inference is that they would not necessarily keep to a fixed path. 
7. LeRoy Meadows not only testified that he obtained permission from Elmer 
Wright to use the East Fork Road,85 but he also confirmed that there was a gate at the 
entrance to the road86 and that it was the public reputation that the roads were private.87 He 
further testified that the road or trail he traveled as a boy was in a different location than the 
current road.88 Boyers claim Elmer Wright did not own the property and therefore did not 
have authority to give permission,89 but the Wrights were early settlers in the area90 and very 
well could have had lease or other rights in the property before they acquired title.91 This is 
83/</.p. 519. 
uId. p. 622. 
85Deposition of LeRoy Meadows p. 11. 
86/</.p. 13. 
%1Id. p. 20. 
uId. p. 35-36. 
89Boyers'briefat28. 
^Defendants Ex. 137 at JC 2365. 
91See Transcript vol. Ill, p. 683-84 (Wright brothers had extensive livestock operations 
in 1932, supporting an inference they had operated prior to then). 
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consistent with the testimony of LeRoy Meadows that he viewed Elmer Wright as a person 
with authority to grant or deny permission. 
The mere existence of a horse trail and proof of occasional use does not establish a 
public road. While use does not need to be extensive, it needs to be more than occasional or 
intermittent.92 The East Fork Road did not appear on maps of the period. A rough horse trail 
may have existed beyond the end of the road, but Boyers presented no clear and convincing 
evidence of continuous public use for ten years. Since at least 1932, Howard Haynes took 
overt actions to interrupt public use. The trial court's finding that the East Fork Road was 
not public should be affirmed. 
V: ANY PUBLIC USE OF THE ROADS WAS PRESUMED 
PERMISSIVE AND DID NOT RESULT IN A DEDICATION TO 
THE PUBLIC. 
Jacobs and Summit County assert there is no evidence that the use of the road was 
permissive.93 This ignores the testimony of Fem Boyer, cited in Haynes's opening brief, that 
"It was just like wide open country. There were no gates, no fences. Everyone seemed to 
enjoy everyone else and do whatever they wanted."94 The case authorities establishes that 
such use is presumed permissive.95 Because all the land involved in this case was wild and 
92See argument and cases cited at pages 40-41 of Haynes's opening brief. 
93Jacobs' brief at 47; Summit County brief at 7. 
94Transcriptvol.II,431. 
95
 See J. J. Marticelli, Annotation, Acquisition by user or prescription of right of way 
over uninclosed land, 46 A.L.R.2d 1140 (1956). See also cases cited in Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 F.3d 735, 775-76 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(infrequent use of wild, unenclosed areas does not create a public road). 
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unenclosed during the times at issue, this Court should hold that the use was permissive and 
did not create a public road. 
This is consistent with the concept that before a road "becomes public in character the 
owner of the land must consent to the change."96 With wild, unenclosed land such as this, 
the only reasonable presumption is that the owner permitted the limited use but did not 
consent to the permanent public rights now claimed by the defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should hold that because the roads were in wild, unenclosed territory, the 
use of the road by members of the public was presumed permissive. With respect to the East 
Fork Road, this Court should affirm that any public portion did not extend beyond the road 
as shown on maps of the period, and should further hold that no portion of the road was 
public for the reasons stated in Haynes's opening brief. 
With respect to any segment of the road ultimately determined to be public, the Court 
should hold that the width of the road must be determined by a court; this Court should 
reverse the delegation of that decision to the County. The Court should direct the entry of 
judgment determining the road width is 18 feet in accordance with the trial court's 
provisional finding. Jacobs already had a full opportunity to present evidence and is not 
96Morris v. Blunt, 49 Utah 243, 251, 161 P. 1127, 1131 (1916). See also Vaughn v. 
Williams, 345 So. 2d 1195,1199 (La. Ct. App. 1977). Summit County asserts in its brief (p. 
7) that any requirement of intent has been abandoned. Although some cases so stated, e.g. 
Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997), the requirement of intent was 
reinstated by Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, 179 P.3d 768, and Town of Leeds 
v. Prisbrey, 2008 UT 11, 179 P.3d 757. See Clay Alger, Comment, Use Interrupted: The 
Complicated Evolution of Utah's Highway Dedication Doctrine, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1613, 
1635 ("the bright-line test brought intent back into the analysis"). 
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entitled to a second opportunity to present its case. But, if the matter is remanded for further 
findings, this Court should clarify that the width should be such as will accommodate the use 
at the time the road became public and not for any uses beyond the historic use. 
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